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RECENT DECISIONS
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE GENERAL CHOICE OF LAWS PROVISION
EMPHASIZES CONTRACTUAL ASPECTS OF A TRANSACTION.-Defendant ordered
a truck from plaintiff in Cody, Wyoming, but accepted delivery in Bil-
lings, Montana. Defendant asked that a statement of origin or other evi-
dence of title be given him in Billings, but received none. Defendant sub-
sequently took the truck to Cody where it was destroyed by fire while
defendant was installing equipment on it. Plaintiff then tendered a state-
ment of origin to defendant which defendant refused and plaintiff sued
for the price of the truck. Defendant's motion for summary judgment,
on the grounds that under Montana law title had not passed to him, was
granted. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, held, reversed.
The transaction bore an "appropriate relation" to Wyoming and therefore
the provisions of that state's Uniform Commercial Code1 were applicable.
Under UCC § 2-606 (1)c defendant accepted the truck by performing
an act inconsistent with plaintiff's ownership and was therefore liable
for the contract price. Park County Implement Co. v. Craig, 397 P.2d 800
(Wyo. 1964).
The UCC has adopted a contractual choice of laws rule in its general
choice of laws provision. Although special provisions govern most choice
of laws problems under the code, the general provision is applicable to
some sale transactions.2 Traditionally, courts have applied the law of
the situs of property to determine whether title to property has passed. 3
Under the UCC, it is not certain that the law of the situs would always
be applied to determine this question, since the criteria for determining
choice of law, based on contractual choice of law, only incidentally in-
volve situs.
4
There has been little uniformity in the choice of laws rules applicable
1Hereinafter UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE will be cited UCC.
2The general provision, UCC § 1-105(1) is given infra at . All comments made in
this article on choice of laws problems under the UCC are limited to § 1-105(1). The
special provisions are outside the scope of this article. The applicability of § 1-105(1)
is limited by these provisions. § 1-105(2) [REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §
87A-1-105 (2)] provides:
Where one of the following provisions of this Act specifies the applicable
law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to
the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so
specified:
Rights of creditors against sold goods. Section 2-402.
Applicability of the Article on Bank Deposits and Collections. Section
4-102.
Bulk Transfers subject to the Article on Bulk Transfers. Section 6-102.
Applicability of the Article on Investment Securities. Section 8-106.
Policy and scope of the Article on Secured Transactions. Sections 9-102
and 9-103.
31Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 114, 122 (1951).
'In the instant case the result might have been the same under the situs rule as under
the UCC choice of laws provision. This is discussed infra at 243.
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to contracts.5 Each jurisdiction has chosen its rules for determining gov-
erning law from several alternatives:'
1. The law of the state of contracting, that is, the jurisdiction
where the contract is negotiated;
2. The law of the state where the contract is performed;
3. The law of the state which the parties stipulate to govern;
4. The law of the state with the most substantial contacts with
the contract.
Application of any of these rules can often prove difficult since a
contract is a mobile chose in action that may be initiated and executed in
several jurisdictions.
1. The law of the state of contracting means the law of the state where
the negotiations were consummated. This was the dominant rule before
the adoption of the UCC,7 and was based on the presumed intent of the
parties.
8
The primary disadvantage of applying this rule is that the law of
the state of contracting may have an insignificant relation to the con-
tractf No part of the performance of the contract, or only a minute part,
may have been transacted in that jurisdiction. Moreover, deciding where
a contract is made may not be easy. For example, a contract negotiated
by mail could be "made" in several jurisdictions.
2. Some jurisdictions apply the law of the state of performance-the
jurisdiction in which the terms of the contract are fulfilled. This jurisdic-
tion would have a substantial "governmental interest" in controlling the
performance of the contract,' 0 and arguably it should be allowed to inter-
pret the contract according to its own law. This approach, however, is too
uncertain in many cases because it is difficult to determine the state
where a contract is "performed" in an interstate transaction. State lines
today have a significance which is more legal than commercial and trans-
actions are frequently performed in several states.
'In Walter Whitman Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 125 F. Supp. 137 (D. Del. 1954),
it was said that choice of laws rules in the contracts field are the most perplexing of
any conflict rules. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 38, gives a two page descrip-
tion of the confusion and irreconcilable decisions in the field.
ONote, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy" in Contracts, 57 CJLUM. L. Rxv. 553,
554 (1957.
7This is the rule adopted by the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (1934).
Comment d to this section provides that a contract is deemed to have been made
where the principle event necessary to make it a binding obligation took place.
sDeaton v. Vise, 186 Tenn. 364, 210 S.W.2d 665, 668 (1948).
'Cochran v. Ellsworth, 126 Cal. App. 2d 429, 272 P.2d 904, 908 (1954).
"The phrase "governmental interest" denotes policy considerations, such as legality
of the contract. Briggs, The Need for the "Legislative Jurisdictional Principle" in
a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws, 39 MINN. L. REV. 517, 529 (1955).
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3. Most jurisdictions have allowed the parties to stipulate the law to gov-
ern their contract as long as their purpose was not to evade local law."
The recent cases that have refused to recognize stipulations have done so
not for theoretical reasons, but because third parties' rights might be
infringed 12 or because the contract did not incorporate the parties' in-
tent" or because there was no bargaining equality between the parties.14
Section 1-105 of the UCC provides in part:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state
or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or
of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.
Failing such agreement this Act applies to transaction bearing
an appropriate relation to this state. (Emphasis added.)
So far as it recognizes party stipulation, the UCC marks no significant
break with the past. It is nonetheless progressive because the parties may
place more reliance on their stipulation being upheld than they could be-
fore. Arguments under the UCC will center on the limits of these stipula-
tions.
There are three types of limitations on stipulation: common law,
statutory, and the Commissioners' Comment on the Code. The common
law limitations 15 are equitable in nature and will continue to be used
under the UCC. A "reasonable relation" is the only statutory limitation
placed on stipulation. The Comment' 6 suggests this phrase be interpreted
in light of Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co.1 7 In that case a Pennsyl-
vania corporation loaned credit to a borrower in New York at a rate of
interest unlawful in New York but lawful in Pennsylvania. The United
States Supreme Court upheld the transaction for the parties could fix the
situs of the contract in a jurisdiction that had a "natural and vital con-
"The parties had to stipulate in good faith. See, for example, Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star, 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43
F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930), cert. den. 282 U.S. 897 (1931); Burton, The Uniform Corn-
maercial Code and Conflict of Laws, 9 Am. J. ComP. L. 458 (1960). Party stipulation
has not always been held in favor in the United States. In E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard
S. S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931) the court said:
People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place; they may
of course incorporate any provisions they wish into their agreements-
a statute like anything else-and when they do, courts will try to make
sense out of the whole, so far as they can. But an agreement is not a
contract, except as the law says it shall be, and to try to make it one is to
pull on one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligations, and the
parties have nothing whatever to do with that; no more than with whether
their acts are torts or crimes.
See also 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 332.2 (1935).
2Industrial Packaging Prod. Co. v. Ft. Pitt Packaging Int'l., 399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d
19 (1960). The third party was a creditor of one of the contracting parties who
would have been unprotected had the stipulation been upheld.
"
3 See, e.g., Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950); Boston Law
Book Co. v. Hathorn, 119 Vt. 416, 127 A.2d 120 (1956)..
"See, for example, Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
"See above at footnotes 12, 13 and 14.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 1-105, at 16 (1962).
"7274 U.S. 403 (1927).
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nection" with the contract, so long as they did so in good faith. Because
the corporation had its office in Pennsylvania and was incorporated there,
Pennsylvania bore a "normal relation" to the transaction.
Although the Comment suggests that the jurisdiction stipulated
must be where "a significant enough portion of the making or performance
of the contract is to occur,"1 8 the Seeman case indicates that one party's
domicil would bear a "reasonable relation." The Comment also states that
the contract need have "no significant contact" with the jurisdiction
stipulated, though this phrase is at odds with Seeman's "natural and
vital connection." The Comment only illustrates what is evident from the
phrase "reasonable relation"; it is intentionally flexible and incapable of
precise definition. This Comment gives guideposts which are inconsistent
in detail, but which indicate that good faith and some contact with the
jurisdiction chosen are necessary. Further demarcation is wisely left to
the courts.
The primary commercial advantage in allowing parties to stipulate
the governing law is that they can foresee the legal consequences of their
actions. That they can stipulate is therefore more important than what
they do stipulate, and reasonable stipulations should be upheld.
4. The most recent of the traditional approaches to choice of laws is the
substantial contacts rule. It has its counterpart in the UCC "appropriate
relation" test. Again the Comment offers indication of what constitutes
an appropriate relationship. It first gives examples of what a state
would not bear such a relation, 19 and then hints that the code should be
given as wide an application as possible. 20
The test for choice of laws under the substantial contacts rule is:
(1) what is the "center of gravity" of the facts, or (2) which jurisdiction
has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute, or (3) which
is more intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litiga-
tion, or (4) whether one rule or the other produces the best practical
result. 21 The advantage of this approach is that intent of the parties,
traditional conflicts rules, and policy interests of the states involved can
all be considered. 22
'
8Supra note 16.
IUCC Comment, supra note 16, at 16-17.
[T]he mere fact that suit is brought in a state does not make it appro-
priate to apply the substantive law of that state. Cases where a relation
to the enacting state is not "appropriate" include, for example, those
where the parties have clearly contracted on the basis of some other law,
as where the law of the place of contracting and the law of the place of
contemplated performance are the same and are contrary to the law under
the Code.
"The code is comprehensive and a reformulation of the law merchant, thus justifying
wide application. Id.
'Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbit Industries, 239 IF.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1956).
The Comment suggests comparison with this case to determine when a state bears an
appropriate relation. UCC Comment, supra note 19, at 17.
'Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.L.R.2d 246 (1954). In W. H.
Barber v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945) the court said:
The court will consider all acts of the parties touching the transaction
in relation to the several states involved and will apply as govern-
ing the transaction the law of that state with which the facts are in
most intimate contact.
[Vol. 26,
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Substantial contacts and "appropriate relation" arc not, however,
identical. The former concept is still bound by the notion that the law
of but one jurisdiction is applicable to a contract. The appropriate re-
lation test implies that to a single contract, several states' laws might be
applicable. Nonetheless, the concepts are similar for the criteria to be
used in determining appropriate relation are similar to those for deter-
mining substantial contacts.
The cases thus far decided under the code do not indicate clearly
what an appropriate relation is, but weigh the contacts which the contract
has with several states in determining the applicable law.23 Predictably,
the law of the forum is generally applied.2 4
The appropriate relation test presents a problem to the practicing
attorney because it is difficult to predict which state law will apply.25
As the UCC becomes more widely adopted, 26 the applicable law is quite
likely to be that of the state in which suit is brought. This problem in
forecasting can only be solved by stipulation.
The instant case adopts the analysis of the substantial contacts cases,
and those cases decided in other code states in weighing contacts. The
Wyoming court mentioned that the trip to Billings to pick up the truck
was a "minor part of ths transaction, and the portions occurring in Wyo-
ming bear an appropriate relation to an extent that the UCC applies. '27
The court then applied the applicable UCC property law provision 28 and
determined that title had passed. Absent the UCC, the result might have
been the same, although the case would have been decided without refer-
ence to contract law. Instead, the court would have applied the law of
the situs of the property to determine if title had passed.
29
The UCC appropriate relation test would not always result in ap-
plication of the law of the situs of the property. Although the state of
situs would bear an appropriate relation, the forum (not necessarily the
same jurisdiction as the situs) might bear such a relation. Therefore it
may sometimes be difficult to predict which state law will control title
aspects of a transaction.30
'See, e.g., Welding Engineers v. Aetna-Standard Engineering Co., 169 F. Supp. 146
(W.D.Pa. 1958); Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 345 Mass. 426, 187 N.E.2d
669 (1963).
"See, for example, Around the World Shopper Club v. U.S., 198 F. Supp. 773 (N.J.
1961), aff, 309 F.2d 324 (1962); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. 649,
165 A.2d 704 (1961).
'Nordstrom, Choice of Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 364,
373. (1963).
"
6As of 1964, 30 states had adopted the UCC.
-397 P.2d at 802.
2UCC § 2-606(1)c.29Arguably Wyoming was the situs of the property for determining passage of title,
although the trial court determined that Montana was the situs for such purpose.
3 heinstein, supra note 2, at 123. Rheinstein was criticizing an earlier draft of the
UCC which was adopted only in Pennsylvania and called for a wider application of
forum law than does § 1-105 as adopted by Montana. His comments are valid, albeit
less forcefully, to the present version of the code.
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It is submitted that the UCC conflict of laws provision, by giving
wide discretion to the parties in stipulating governing law, and by adopt-
ing a flexible test for determining governing law where it is not stipu-
lated has promulgated practical rules for commercial usage. In both
situations the UCC has tests that allow courts considerable discretion.
Where the UCC has introduced uncertainty, it can often be overcome by
stipulation. Where stipulation is impracticable, certainty must await
judicial interpretation.
PAUL K. KELLER.
FEDERAL POWER ComivuIssIoN RESOLVES CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIORITY
AND PREFERENCE IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE POWER PRODUCERS.-On April 8,
1955, the Federal Power Commission granted Pacific Northwest Power
Company' a preliminary permit 2 for Project No. 2173.' This permit was
to be effective for three years. Project No. 2173 consisted of two dams on
the Snake River-Mountain Sheep and Pleasant Valley, at river miles
192.6 and 213.2. Later, PNPC's application for a license to build this
project was denied on the ground that the Nez Perce dam site at river
mile 186.7 was best suited to develop this section of the Snake.4 On
March 30, 1958, PNPC filed an application for a license to build a dam
at the High Mountain Sheep site on the Snake at river mile 189.2. PNPC
contended that, under section 5 of the Federal Power Act,5 priority of
'The Pacific Northwest Power Company, hereinafter referred to as PNPC, was organ-
ized in 1954, by five Pacific Northwest private power companies: Pacific Power and
Light, Mountain States Power (subsequently merged with Pacific Power and Light),
Portland General Electric, Montana Power Company, and Washington Water Power.
Each company owns a one-fourth interest in the larger organization. PNPC was in-
corporated in Oregon, April 26, 1954, and was subsequently authorized to conduct
business in the states of Oregon, Idaho, Washington, and Montana. PNPC was
created to provide joint development of major hydroelectric projects, and to insure
a suitable supply of electricity when needed by the organizing companies.
'The preliminary permit was issued pursuant to Federal Power Act § 4(f), 49 STAT.
839 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1958) which says, "The commission is hereby author-
ized and empowered- . . . to issue preliminary permits for the purpose of enabling
applicants for a license hereunder to secure the data and to perform the acts required
by section 9 [802] hereof. . . ." This permit does not authorize the party to whom
it is granted to begin construction of the project. It merely gives the permittee a
period during which it can investigate the proposed site and maintain priority for
license application under section 5 [798] of the act. See notes 3 and 5 infra.
Federal Power Act § 9, 41 STAT. 1068 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 802 (1958) requires that
an applicant for a license submit certain maps, plans, specifications, and estimates
of cost to the Commission.
'Pacific Northwest Power Co., Project No. 2173, 14 F.P.C. 644 (1955). The Commis-
sion ordered that, "This preliminary permit is issued to Pacific Northwest Power
Company. . . for a period of three years, effective as of April 1, 1955, for the sole
purpose of maintaining priority of application for license for Project No. 2173."'
'Pacific Northwest Power Company, Project No. 2173, 19 F.P.C. 127, at 131 (1958).
The Commission denied a rehearing on this matter, reaffirming their original holding.
Pacific Northwest Power Company, Project No. 2173, 19 F.P.C. 353 (1958).
5Federal Power Act § 5, 49 STAT. 841 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 798 (1958) provides:
Each preliminary permit issued under this Part shall be for the sole
purpose of maintaining priority of application for a license under the terms
of this Act for such period or periods, not exceeding a total of three
years, as in the discretion of the Commission may be necessary for making
examinations and surveys, for preparing maps, plans, specifications, and
estimates, and for making financial arrangements. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
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